We employ real-time data available to the US monetary policy makers to estimate a Taylor rule augmented with a measure of …nancial uncertainty over the period . We …nd evidence in favor of a systematic response to …nancial uncertainty over and above that to expected in ‡ation, output gap, and output growth. However, this evidence regards the Greenspan-Bernanke period only. Focusing on this period, the "risk-management" approach is found to be responsible for monetary policy easings for up to 75 basis points of the federal funds rate.
1 Introduction "[...] The Federal Reserve's experiences over the past two decades make it clear that uncertainty is not just a pervasive feature of the monetary policy landscape; it is the de…ning characteristic of that landscape. [...] the conduct of monetary policy in the United States has come to involve, at its core, crucial elements of risk management."
Alan Greenspan (2004) Does the Federal Reserve act as a risk-manager? The quote by Former Federal Reserve's chairman Alan Greenspan points to a positive answer. This paper provides empirical support to this view by quantifying the implications of this "risk management" approach for the federal funds rate. We do so by estimating a Taylor rule augmented with a measure of …nancial uncertainty over the period 1969M1-2008M10, and by computing the "risk-management-driven policy rate gap". This gap measures the di¤erence between the actual policy rate and the counterfactual policy rate that would have been observed had the Federal Reserve not acted as a "risk manager", i.e., had it not reacted to ‡uctuations in …nancial uncertainty. Our estimates focus on the entire sample as well as on subsamples identi…ed by changes of the Federal Reserve's chairman to take into account possible breaks in policymakers' preferences both over risk management and over in ‡ation and output stabilization (Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) , Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) , Castelnuovo and Fanelli (2015) , Boivin and Giannoni (2006) , Castelnuovo and Surico (2010) ). Importantly, we employ data available in real-time to the Federal Open Market Committee, which is crucial to correctly characterize monetary policy decisions by the Federal Reserve (Orphanides (2001 (Orphanides ( , 2002 , Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011, 2012) , Gnabo and Moccero (2015) ).
We …nd signi…cant evidence in favor of a systematic monetary policy response to movements in …nancial uncertainty. However, this evidence is limited to the Great Moderation period characterized by the lead of Greenspan and Bernanke. The GreenspanBernanke risk management approach is associated to a looser monetary policy with respect to the one the Federal Reserve would have implemented had it not reacted to …nancial uncertainty directly. The estimated median value of the "risk-managementdriven" policy rate gap is 30 basis points, which is approximately a standard policy rate move. However, in correspondence to well-identi…ed historical events (Black Monday, 2008 credit crunch), such a gap is estimated to be three times as large due to the higher realizations of …nancial uncertainty.
Many empirical proxies of uncertainty have recently been proposed by the literature (for a survey, see Bloom (2014) ). We focus on …nancial uncertainty for three reasons.
First, Angelini, Bacchiocchi, Caggiano, and Fanelli (2017) and Ludvigson, Ma, and Ng (2018) …nd that …nancial uncertainty shocks -as opposed to macroeconomic uncertainty disturbances -are drivers of the business cycle. Second, and related to the previous point, several papers have recently documented the contribution of …nancial uncertainty shocks to the US business cycle (Bloom (2009), Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Groshenny (2014) , Leduc and Liu (2016) , Basu and Bundick (2017) , Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Nodari (2017) , Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Pellegrino (2017) ). Third, …nancial uncertainty is likely to have strong connections with the uncertainty characterizing the future evolution of the US economy, above all as far as output growth is concerned (Evans, Fisher, Gourio, and Krane (2015) ).
The closest papers to ours are Evans, Fisher, Gourio, and Krane (2015) and Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramírez (2015) . The …rst paper presents theoretical motivations for a risk management approach by monetary policymakers (one example being asymmetric loss functions, which imply the presence of second-order elements in the optimal monetary policy feedback function), and document a systematic response to di¤erent measures of uncertainty during Greenspan's regime (which is the only regime they investigate). The second paper shows that a nonlinear DSGE framework matches the data better when a systematic monetary policy response to …scal uncertainty is modeled. We complement these papers by i) showing that the Federal Reserve's risk management-type of response to macroeconomic shocks is monetary policy regime-speci…c, and ii) de…ning and quantifying the risk-management driven policy rate gap.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 o¤ers details on the empirical strategy. Section 3 documents our estimates and proposes the risk-management driven policy rate gap. Section 4 concludes.
Empirical strategy
Taylor rule. We consider the following Taylor rule:
Eq.
(1) describes the evolution of the Taylor rate in absence of interest rate persistence. In this equation, t;k stands for the average annualized in ‡ation rate from t to t + k, is the in ‡ation target, x t;q is the average output gap from t to t + q, y t;p is the average output growth from t to t + p, y is the output growth target, unc t stands for …nancial uncertainty, E t denotes expectations conditional on information available to the FOMC at time t, and R is the Taylor rate conditional on in ‡ation and output growth being at the target, a zero output gap, and a concern by policymakers for uncertainty equal to zero. 2 Given that the FOMC has a preference for implementing variations in the policy rate in a smooth manner (English, Nelson, and Sack (2003) ,
L is the lag operator, and N denotes the number of federal funds rate lags. Finally, we allow for the presence of monetary policy shocks via the zero-mean, constant variance error term v t .
Combining equations (1) and (2) yields to the following linear equation:
where b i ; i = 0; ; x; y, and unc are nonlinear functions of the structural parameters , x , y , y t;p , R , and :
Data. We estimate eq. (3) with real-time data. In particular, we employ the Greenbook forecasts of current and future in ‡ation, output gap, and output growth. The interest rate is the federal funds rate set at each FOMC meeting. The measure of …nancial volatility is the VXO of the "Greenbook day", which is the day in which the Greenbook is …nalized (typically, a few days before each FOMC meeting). Given that before 1986 the VXO is not available, we proxy it with the volatility of S&P500 returns computed over a 30-day window before the Greenbook day. Estimation. We estimate the Taylor rule (3) via ordinary least squares, which delivers consistent estimates of the Taylor rule coe¢ cients given the real-time nature of the data. 4 We account for heteroskedasticity by using the Newey-West correction 2 As in Evans, Fisher, Gourio, and Krane (2015), we assume the implicit target for uncertainty to be equal to zero. This implies that also moderate, below-mean levels of uncertainty are interpreted as economically harmful by monetary policymakers. This view is corroborated by models à la Bloom (2009) and Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry (2018) , which assume a non-zero inaction region for whatever positive level of uncertainty, and Basu and Bundick (2017) , which deliver negative e¤ects of uncertainty independently of the size of the uncertainty shock.
3 Our results are robust to employing the volatility of S&P500 returns over the whole sample. 4 See Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) (page 355, foonote 17) for an in-depth discussion on the properties of OLS in this context. of the variance of the estimated coe¢ cients. As in Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011, 2012) , we set k = 2, q = p = 0, and N = 2. The choice of two lags of the policy rate is in line with Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) , which is the seminal paper regarding Taylor rules for the United States, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) , who also work with real time data, and Ascari, Castelnuovo, and Rossi (2011) , who …nd a Taylor rule with two lags of the policy rate to be associated to a higher marginal likelihood in the context of a battery of estimated DSGE models.
We estimate eq. (3) over the full sample 1969M1-2008M10. The beginning of the sample is justi…ed by data availability, while the end in October 2008 is the last FOMC meeting before the beginning of the ZLB period, which can hardly be described by a standard Taylor rule modeling conventional monetary policy. As anticipated, we also estimate eq. (3) over di¤erent subsamples. Due to sample numerosity, we bundle the regimes characterized by Martin's, Burns', and Miller's chairmanships on the one hand, and Greenspan's and Bernanke's on the other hand, under (respectively) the "Great
In ‡ation" regime and the "Great Moderation" one (although, as regards the latter, we check our results by focusing on Greenspan's regime only). We also consider a third regime, which is the one characterized by Volcker's lead of the Federal Reserve.
Empirical results
Evidence of risk management. Table 1 collects our estimates, which -as for output and in ‡ation -con…rm previous …ndings in the literature, in particular those by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011, 2012) .
5 Relevant for our study is the systematic response to …nancial uncertainty. The regimes of Greenspan and Bernanke are associated to a signi…cant response of the policy rate to …nancial uncertainty. It is important to stress that this response is found to be signi…cant in spite of the presence of in ‡ation, output gap, output growth, and two lags of the policy rate in the Taylor rule. Our evidence points to a negative reaction of the policy rate to …nancial uncertainty, i.e., to a looser monetary policy than the one described by in ‡ation and real activity only. Di¤erently, evidence consistent with risk management is found neither during the Great In ‡ation 5 These estimates represent the on-impact systematic response of the federal funds rate to movements in the macroeconomic aggregates on the right-hand side of the Taylor rule. We focus on the on-impact coe¢ cients because we will use them later to construct the risk management-driven policy rate gap. The implied long-run Taylor rule coe¢ cients, which are often documented in the Taylor rule context, and which take into account the impact of interest rate smoothing for the long-run monetary policy response to in ‡ation, output, and …nancial uncertainty, are documented in our Appendix for the sake of brevity. period nor during Volcker's regime.
Risk management-driven policy rate gap. What is the impact of risk management on the policy rate? We quantify it by computing the di¤erence between the actual policy rate R t and the …tted policy rate conditional on setting the response to …nancial uncertainty to zero b R no_unc t . We label this object "risk management-driven policy rate gap". Formally, this gap is computed as b R
Figure 1 plots the risk management-driven policy rate gap. A few observations are in order. First, the gap is negative. This evidence, which is a direct implication of b b unc < 0, suggests a cautious behavior by the Federal Reserve in presence of uncertainty, i.e., a looser monetary policy than the one the Federal Reserve would have implemented in a world without uncertainty. Second, the median realization of this gap is 30 basis points, i.e., about the size of a standard policy move. Third, the largest realizations (in absolute value) of this gap occur in correspondence of well-identi…ed historical events, e.g., the Black Monday (84 basis points) and the 2008 credit crunch (80 basis points), which are roughly equivalent to three standard policy moves. Other historical events, such as the two Gulf wards, the Asian crisis, the Worldcom/Enron scandals, the Russian and LTCM defaults, and 9/11 are also associated with peaks of the policy rate gap.
Conclusions
We estimate augmented Taylor rules with real time data which feature a measure of …nancial uncertainty among the explanatory variables. We …nd evidence of a signi…cant policy response to …nancial uncertainty during the Greenspan-Bernanke period. We then propose an estimate of the "risk management-driven policy rate gap", which is the gap between the actual rate and a counterfactual policy rate implemented in absence Appendix of the paper: "Risk Management-Driven Policy Rate Gap" by Giovanni Caggiano, Efrem Castelnuovo, and Gabriela Nodari This Appendix documents extra results which, for the sake of brevity, we decided not to include in the main text.
Taylor rule estimates: Long-run parameters. Table A1 collects the long-run estimates computed by translating the short-run estimates reported in the text into long-run one by accounting for the role of interest rate smoothing. Formally, j = (1 a 1 a 2 ) 1 b j , with j = ; x; y, and unc. To be sure, the estimated parameters a 1 and a 2 are the same as those already documented in the text.
Dating of the policy rate gap peaks. Table A2 reports the dating of the policy rate gap peaks documented in the paper.
Extra notes on the data. After building up the series of the federal funds rate used in this analysis, we confronted it with the target federal funds rate set at each meeting produced by Romer and Romer (2004) and updated by Mu-Jeung Yang and Wieland (2007) . The correlation between these two policy rates in the sample 1969M1-2007M12 is 0.99.
Risk management-driven policy rate gap: VAR evidence. The risk management-driven policy rate gap proposed in the text is computed conditional on a Taylor rule framework, which does not acknowledge the dynamic feedback e¤ect going from changes in the policy rate to in ‡ation, real activity, and …-nancial uncertainty. We check our estimate of the policy rate gap by running an alternative exercise in which all variables of our analysis are modeled as endogenous. We do so by estimating a reduced-form VAR(2) model modeling the vector [E t t;k ; E t x t;q ; E t y t;p ; unc t ; R t ] 0 , where -as for our Taylor rule exercise documented in the text -we set k = 2 and q = p = 0. We compute the policy rate gap by taking the di¤erence between the actual policy rate and the policy rate simulated by switching o¤ the systematic response of the rate to …nancial uncertainty at all lags. We employ the period 1984M1-1987M7 as a "burn in" period to initialize the endogenous variables, and consider the period 1987M8-2008M10 for the computation of the policy rate gap. Figure A1 depicts 
